Meta-philosophy

Meta-philosophy isphilosophical study ofmethodsaims properphilosophy. It is, aswere,"philosophyphilosophy".

The paradigmatic questionsmeta-philosophyquestions concerningnaturephilosophical problems (or, as some would prefer, puzzles), andproper methodssetting aboutanswer them. Another setrelated questions, particularly importantancient philosophers, dealt withvaluephilosophyphilosophical knowledge, andclosely related problem ofrelationship between philosophical criticismordinary life. Other questions, whichperhapssomewhat more concernscientifically-minded modern philosophers,concerned withrelationship between philosophy andnatural sciences, andquestionwhether philosophy can make progress insame sense asspecial sciences.

Howmeta-philosophy possible?

Philosophersnotoriousbeing ablemakemost commonplace topic collapse intoself-referential hallmirrors, andexistence"meta-philosophy" may seemclearest confirmation imaginable. It may seem thatwhole affair cannot help but fall intomassive exercisecircular reasoning; after all, what method could you usephilosophize about philosophical method? If you don't havemethod, what can you usefind one? And if you do have one, why go looking? It seems that meta-philosophical questions can hardly be asked unless theyalready answered.

Nevertheless, whilecertainly seems weirdphilosophyturn its own methods upon itself, it's far from clear what other methods might be appropriateaddressing such questions. After all, if philosophylanguage isvalid study, thenseems that one ofthings thatcan validly study isnaturephilosophical language,if epistemology (the theoryknowledge) isvalid study, thenseems that one ofthingscan validly studyphilosophical knowledge. The lesson here, then, may not be so much that philosophy cannot address questionsphilosophical method, but rather that questions ofmethodsnaturephilosophy must be (aswere) explored frominside, rather than discovered from some impossible outside perspective. A philosopher who does meta-philosophy, then,not taking some special standpoint from outsidephilosophylook indetermine what philosophy is; rather, shedoing exactly what she doesall other sortsphilosophy. If this iscase, then there iscertain flatteningmeta-philosophy back intomainstreamphilosophical inquiry. As Ludwig Wittgenstein was fond pointing out, by wayanalogy, when you learn spelling, one ofwords you learnspell"SPELLING." But we don't speak"spelling ofsecond-order."

It may not be surprising, then,find that many seminal worksphilosophy end upmeta-philosophical reflection ascentral partdoing philosophywhat seembe entirely different fields. Although Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-PhilosophicusPhilosophical Investigationsworks directly concerning logic,philosophylanguage, andphilosophymind,naturephilosophical puzzlesphilosophical understandingcentralall ofdiscussions; Wittgenstein frequently diagnoses philosophical errors as involving confusions aboutnaturephilosophical inquiry. Northisnew feature inphilosophical world:tradition goes backno lessphilosopher than Plato, whose dialoguesdirectly concernedethics, but constantly raise questionsphilosophical method (most explicitly addressed inMeno),valueproper aimsphilosophy (inApology, Gorgias, Protagoras, etc.), andproper relationship between philosophical criticismeveryday life (a theme running throughout all his works, but explored most famously inRepublic).